Weighing University Justifications Against Employee Rights
To be sure, the University would be well within its rights to enforce time, place, and manner limitations on speech. However, the ability to limit speech does not translate to a total ban to protect its interests. Each of the University’s interests may be accomplished with other, less restrictive means that would allow the protected chalking under §31-51q to survive. As a result, the University justifications arguably prove insufficient to override protected speech, and the proscription remains overbroad.
“As-Applied” Challenges to the Moratorium
The possibility of a facial challenge to the chalking ban on the grounds of overbreadth was discussed above—the moratorium was unacceptably overbroad in that it proscribed both protected and unprotected speech. In addition to this facial challenge, an “as applied” challenge questions whether the policy appears content-neutral in face but is actually content-based or viewpoint-based as applied. This is to say, is the University inappropriately stricter on enforcing the ban in certain areas of campus or on certain content?
More sleuthing would need to be done to deduce an empirical answer. However, it at least appears that the answer may be yes. Chalking that occurs outside Usdan, for example, seems to be routinely washed away much more quickly than chalking that occurs, say, on the walkways above Foss Hill.
Furthermore, let us take as an example the chalk portraits featured on Wesleying on March 5. Although Wesleying provided photographic evidence of the chalking as well as the locations, these were not erased but were instead left exposed in all their sordid, fiendish glory until they were covered by the March 8 snow. Unless the University is unaware of Wesleying’s existence, the question becomes why the administration did not jump to destroy the chalking. Is it because the chalking was not controversial? Is it because they added some aesthetic beauty (in contrast to the argument made by Bennet above)? Is it because they were not displayed so prominently on college row? Whatever the reasoning, the fact of the matter is that these pieces were not erased despite the blanket ban on all chalking. If all chalking is not erased with the same tenacity, then questions emerge as to whether the ban was really intended to be a content-based—or worse yet, viewpoint-based—limitation on student speech.
If this is true, then students facing discipline for chalking could argue that the moratorium is invalid as applied. It could be argued that those being disciplined were disciplined because of the content and location of their chalking more than the chalking itself. The administration cannot legally cherry pick those chalkings that it particularly dislikes for punishment given the language of the policy. If there is a systematic failure to enforce the elimination of certain chalked content, this could itself jeopardize the legality of the policy as applied.
But again, more data is needed before this argument can effectively be made.
Summary (For the TL;DR Reader)
Both state and federal courts have granted the possibility for state laws to protect individuals from infringements on the freedom of speech by private actors. Wesleyan University, as both a private actor and an employer, is subject to Connecticut General Statutes §31-51q, which makes it illegal for an employer to discipline an employee for engaging in political speech that would be otherwise protected by the First Amendment so long as that speech did not jeopardize the employee’s job performance or working relationship. As a result, Wesleyan’s blanket chalking moratorium is questionably overbroad and should be reneged.
However, this does not suggest that the University cannot possibly enact any limitations on chalking. Hate speech, true threats, and obscenity, inter alia, would not be protected speech and can be censored through a case-by-case analysis that applies contemporary community standards. Further, although the University would conform to legal minimums simply by not disciplining student employees who chalk on issues of national concern, it would be encouraged for the administration to expand this both to non-employees, so as not to create an arbitrary and quasi-classist dividing line, and also to chalking that is not of national concern but at the same time does not fall outside the realm of protected speech (such as “Remember you are beautiful” or “Come to the senior art theses in this week!”).
Practical limitations on chalking—such as limits against hate speech or on the time, place, and manner of chalking—could generate an effective policy that furthers substantive goals while still allowing our civil liberties to survive.
Furthermore, this article is also not meant to suggest that students should turn litigation-happy against the administration. Instead, we should understand our rights as students and use those rights to peacefully assemble, petition the administration to rectify its policies, and posit effective alternatives. We should also continue to view chalking as a privilege and speak out against hateful, obscene, and threatening chalkings as a form of civic engagement so that the University can continue to strive toward the goal of inclusion, safety, and security.
Chalk is talk, and it is high time that students and the administration work together to respect the intricacies of that reality.