Thursday, May 22, 2025



Brandom’s philosophy lecture rejects modern value of truth

In his talk, “Why Truth Doesn’t Matter,” at Russell House Monday night, University of Pittsburgh Professor of Philosophy Robert Brandom argued that truth is a useless and outdated metaphysical concept, that tends to confuse rather than aid logic.

Brandom argued that truth does not matter because the concept explains nothing for a statement.

The concept of truth is expressive, Brandom argued, but that expressive nature does not do enough to actually explain. Far from helping to explain, it can actually confuse logic because truth does not explain the actual, functioning content of a statement.

In addition to raising issues about the function of truth, he suggested another framework to fill in for where truth falls short. According to Brandom, inference is that concept. Conceptual inference is what people actually use when they make truth claims. Inference can play the explanatory role that people think truth does. Truth, however, does not do this. Philosophers should not talk about truth and knowledge, but instead about inferences and understanding. According to Brandom, this will make philosophical work clearer.

Brandom cited the work of 19th century German philosopher Gottlob Frege in his lecture. According to Associate Professor of Philosophy Sanford Shieh, Frege made the most significant advance in philosophy since logic was created by Aristotle.

Frege’s important advance in logic is a formulation of rational justification that is independent of experience. Frege introduced this argument in his most important work, ‘Begriffsschrift,’ which translates to ‘conceptual notation.’ According to Brandom, it is inferential concepts and how they function that is important in logic.

Many students found Brandom’s claims counterintuitive or implausible.
“I am concerned about replacing truth claims with inferences since Frege defined good inferences as ones that maintain truth,” said Anna Tallman ’05.

Other students were critical of turning towards inference without truth.

“It seems that even inferences themselves are based ultimately on some sort of truth claim, or perhaps on the validity of the inference,” said Adam Hetland ’05. “But doesn’t validity of the inference require some sort of truth claim?”

Brandom is renowned for his work in philosophy of mind and especially for his 1994 work, “Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.” Brandom is the Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, where he has been teaching since 1976. He is also a member of the American Academy of the Arts and has been named the John Locke Lecture for next year at Oxford University.

The next Center for Humanities lecture will be given by Andrew W. Mellow Postdoctoral Fellow Alison Redick, who will give a talk entitled, “On Gender’s Threshold: ‘True Sex’ and the Creation of the Intersex Management Protocols.”

The Center for Humanities was created in 1969 to support interdisciplinary research by Wesleyan faculty fellows, visiting professors, student fellows and Mellon fellows. Each semester, the Center, directed by Henry Abelove, Professor of English and American Studies, chooses a particular theme of study. Last fall the theme was “Human and Other Rights,” this spring the theme is “Truth.”

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